INTRODUCTION
In the United States, organized futures markets have been in existence since the mid-19 th century following the official opening of the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) in 1848, where futures contracts started to trade with grains as the underlying commodity. These futures contracts served a good purpose for grain producers and dealers as a protection against adverse future price movements. The futures markets brought together commercial hedgers and speculators in an open, competitive marketplace to determine an asset's price at a single point in time. As these markets became increasingly complex due to the introduction of new futures contracts, more sophisticated strategies, and international market opportunities, users of the futures markets sought more specialized professional advice in managing their futures market assets. This change is especially noticeable after the substantial growth in futures trading in the early 20 th century when newly established exchanges introduced a variety of commodity contracts. The introduction of the world's first financial futures contracts (foreign currency futures) by the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) in 1972 was also an important landmark in futures trading. Other financial futures contracts (e.g., interest rate and stock index futures) appeared in the late 1970s and 1982, respectively.
The successful introduction of futures contracts to encompass equity indices, interest rates, currencies, options, and conventional commodities as well as the globalization of futures trading have expanded the scope of investment possibilities and thus created new profit opportunities for a new type of market participants -managed futures investors. Managed futures refers to the trading of futures and forwards contracts on commodities and financial instruments by either institutions or trading advisors who manage assets in these markets on behalf of their clients. Hence, the managed futures industry consists of professional money managers who manage clients' assets on a systematic or discretionary basis, using global futures and options markets as investment media. Managing clients' assets on a systematic basis involves the managers use of technical trading systems to exploit investment opportunities for the clients' money, while those managed on a discretionary basis involves managers' value judgement on market conditions usually without any trading systems, but still involving some statistical information to help make decision for investing clients' money.
One major incentive for managed futures investments appears to stem from their ability to offer risk reduction through diversification while still offering returns comparable to other traditional investments (e.g., domestic and international equity indexes). Research on traditional security markets shows that market prices react to unexpected changes in micro (e.g., earnings)
or macro (e.g., interest rates and gross national product) information. Trading futures contracts based on forecasts of these fundamental variables may likewise result in positive return/risk tradeoffs. The importance of this research is that managed futures may allow investors to profit from market trends or unexpected changes in information in ways that are not easily available from other managed assets such as stock-based mutual funds. The differences occur because the cash market's transaction costs and institutional restrictions on short selling and leverage make engaging in strategies that involve short positions unprofitable for mutual fund managers.
Hence, managed futures can, in principle, enable an investor to capture those returns available in the spot market more cheaply (e.g., replicate cash indexes with lower transaction costs) and capture opportunities not easily found in spot markets (e.g., the ability to sell short and to alter the degree of leverage in asset positions).
The growth of the managed futures industry increased dramatically in the late 1970s.
While less than US$500 million was invested in 1980, the total investment in managed futures exceeded US$120 billion in 2005. Allocation of funds to managed futures increased because of the investors' desire for higher returns and more effectively managed portfolio risk. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) defines a commodity trading advisor (CTA) as any person, who, for compensation or profit, directly or indirectly advises others regarding the buying or selling of commodity futures and/or option contracts (Ates and Wang, 2008) . It defines a commodity pool operator (CPO) as any individual or firm that operates or solicits funds for a commodity pool. Typically, a number of individuals contribute funds to form a commodity pool.
In the United States, a commodity pool is usually organized as a limited partnership. Most CPOs hire independent CTAs to make daily trading decisions. The CPO may distribute the investment directly or act as a wholesaler to a broker/dealer.
Investing in managed futures can occur in three ways. First, investors can purchase shares of public commodity funds, which are similar to equity or bond mutual funds except that they invest in futures contracts. Public funds provide a way for small (retail) investors to participate in an investment vehicle usually reserved for large investors because they typically have the lowest minimum investment requirements. Second, investors can place funds with a private CPO who pools all investors' funds together and retains one or more professional traders, i.e., CTAs, to manage the pooled funds. Pools have higher minimum investment requirements than public funds. Third, investors can place their funds directly with one or more
CTAs to manage their funds on an individual basis. The minimum investment required by CTAs typically is set higher than public commodity funds and private CPOs.
This chapter discusses the empirical evidence about the performance of managed futures spanning a period of three decades as found in the extant literature. The chapter divides periods of studies into earlier, later, and recent studies. The chapter also discusses and reevaluates the role of managed futures after the financial crisis of 20072008. The final section provides a summary and conclusions.
Performance Assessment of Managed Futures as a Stand-alone Investment
This section discusses the performance of managed futures in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s.
Each of the periods has some distinctively different approaches for assessing performance.
Studies in the 1980s set a benchmark for a performance metric used to assess managed futures. Representative studies in the 1990s used more comprehensive datasets and expanded the scope of research to help gain more insights about the performance of managed futures.
Studies in 2000s built on established research in the 1980s and 1990s and focused on further issues such as performance persistence and market timing ability of managed futures traders.
Earlier Studies in the 1980s
Lintner (1983) is perhaps the first academic to undertake a study on managed futures. He finds that managed futures are an attractive investment vehicle. Yet, later studies such as Rentzler (1987, 1990) and Irwin, Krukemyer, and Zulauf (1993) find that managed futures, at least as represented by public commodity funds, did not generate returns above the risk-free rate. Schneeweis, Savanayana, and McCarthy (1992) confirm earlier results relative to public commodity funds but limit the portfolio to 14 CTAs. Lintner (1983) Besides the stand-alone risk/return characteristics of CTAs, Lintner (1983) also analyzes the potential impact of adding managed futures to a portfolio of stocks (or stocks and bonds).
First, he establishes that for the minimum risk portfolio of CTAs, the correlation coefficient with stocks is -0.07 and with bonds is 0.15. For the minimum risk portfolio of public commodity funds, the correlation coefficient is 0.23 with stocks and 0.15 with bonds.
Later Studies in the 1990s
The earlier studies focused on correlations between managed futures returns and the returns to stocks and bonds. These earlier studies, however, appear to suffer from insufficient data due to the relatively shorter periods of the data availability. The later studies use a relatively larger dataset to further verify the findings of the early period. Edwards and Liew (1999) Similar to earlier research by Lintner (1983) and Elton et al. (1987 Elton et al. ( , 1990 , Edward and Liew (1999) evaluate the performance of managed futures investments based on three stylized portfolios formed for CTAs, pools, and funds. These portfolios are as follows: (1) In assessing the performance of these CTAs, pools, and funds, unlike all other previous studies reviewed, Edwards and Liew (1999) Their results have five major implications. First, a VWMP of pools stands out as an attractive stand-alone investment, with respect to both alternative non-futures investments and other managed futures investments, especially during the 1989 to 1996 period. Although a VWMP of pools earned a somewhat lower average annual return than common stock during this period (13.9 percent compared with 16.0 percent), the lower volatility of pool returns resulted in a higher Sharpe ratio for the VWMP of pools of 0.955. This performance is especially impressive given the extraordinarily high common stock returns during this period. A clear implication of these results is that private pool managers add value: they generate higher returns and Sharpe ratios than do most non-futures investments and outperform other managed futures returns.
Second, single-CTA, pool or fund portfolios or any type of public fund investment do not appear to make an attractive stand-alone investment. Single-CTA, pool or fund portfolios all had high return volatility, and public funds have low returns.
Third, the strong performance of a EWMP of CTAs during the 19821988 period should be given less credibility for two reasons. According to Edwards and Liew (1999) , this period is subject to the greatest survivorship bias and CTA reported returns are highly sensitive to the exclusion rule used to control for self-selection bias.
Fourth, returns on all types of managed futures investments fell substantially in 1989 to 1996, compared to 1982 to 1988, for reasons that remain unclear. A possible "data" explanation, according to Edwards and Liew (1999) , is that returns in the 19821988 period may have been artificially inflated because of an upward survivorship bias, so that the elimination of this bias in the 19891996 period gives the appearance that returns fell during this latter period. Another possibility is that market conditions from 1989 to 1996 may not have been favorable to commodity traders. In particular, most commodity traders were "trend followers" to a greater or lesser degree. Further, commodity prices appeared to exhibit less trend-following behavior in 1989 to 1996 than in the earlier years, which increased the difficulty for traders to identify price trends and to capitalize on such trends. Finally, increased competition occurred during the 19891996 period. With more traders and more capital competing for trading profits, commodity markets may have become more efficient, resulting in lower returns.
Fifth, despite the decline in the level of returns between 1989 and 1996, the Sharpe ratio for a VWMP of pools rose significantly from 0.694 during the 19821988 period to 0.955 during the 19891996 period. Lower return volatility offset the lower returns. However, this result was not replicated for a EWMP of pools or for either a EWMP or a VWMP of CTAs. Thus, large pools were more successful in managing risk than were either small pools or individual CTAs.
Edward and Liew (1999) also provide an alternative way to view managed commodity funds as a separate asset class in a diversified portfolio. They then determine whether portfolio performance is significantly enhanced by including commodity funds in the portfolio.
Edward and Liew (1999) show the simple correlation coefficients between managed commodity fund returns and the returns on other asset classes are generally very low (typically below 0.10) and are often not significantly different from zero. Some correlations are even negative. For example, returns on a VWMP of pools are negatively correlated with S&P 500 common stock returns in all time periods, although they are never significantly different from zero. The highest correlation observed for the 19821996 period is 0.15, which occurs between a VWMP of funds and long-term government bonds. Thus, including managed commodity funds in a diversified asset portfolio should provide diversification benefits.
Recent Studies in the 2000s
The later studies of managed futures performance verified those of the earlier studies. The research conducted by Edward and Liew (1999) is one of the major studies in the later period.
Managed futures returns continue to be low and even more so for the CTA performances. One explanation that Edward and Liew attributed the low returns from 1989 to 1996 is a higher supply of CTAs in the market during that period. Research into correlations of managed futures returns with those of the stocks and bonds continues to show that they exhibit low correlation with each, further qualifying managed futures as good portfolio diversifiers. Recent studies of managed futures performance have moved into areas that investigate, for example, the performance persistence of CTAs. Gregoriou, Hubner, and Kooli (2010) focus on the issue of performance persistence. Given the inferior performance noted in earlier periods, the study's findings would be of interest particularly if a CTA generates not only low returns but also persistent performance.
Gregorious et al. (2010) note that the evidence of return persistence for managed futures in the literature is mixed but generally negative. Irwin, Zulauf, and Ward (1992) , who examine 363 CTAs during the 1979-1989 period, find a lack of performance persistence when using past CTA returns to predict future returns. Irwin et al. (1993) In contrast, McCarthy, Schneeweis, and Spurgin (1996) find some evidence of performance persistence. However, their sample size of 56 CTAs is relatively small and their study only focuses on the 1985-1991 timeframe. These authors observe that multi-advisor managed futures funds display more persistence than single advisor CTAs (Schneeweis, Spurgin, and McCarthy, 1997) . Brorsen (1998) investigates data from private and public funds and CTAs using various statistical methods such as regression analysis, Monte Carlo methods, and out-of-sample tests. He also finds limited evidence of performance persistence. The main drawback of each of these studies is the short examination period during the bull market, while not encompassing any sustained bear market environment.
According to Gregoriou et al. (2010) , only a few attempts to study CTA performance and persistence use parametric models. A possible reason is that regression methods tested so far The authors use chi-square statistics similar to Christensen (1990) to detect statistical significance of persistence. They also use the standard error of the natural logarithm of the CPR as given by Equation 21.1:
The findings from Gregorious et al. (2010) show that a CTA displaying persistence over a horizon of at least three months is more likely to exhibit persistence over a longer period.
However, most of these results do not stand the "acid test," which aims at assessing the relative performance persistence of a CTA by considering the ability of a CTA to stay in a top quartile rather than the top half of a category. Of all the CTAs assessed by the "acid test," the performance persistence of agricultural CTAs appears more robust to a change in testing conditions.
Kazemi and Li (2009) explore the sources of CTA returns. Their study investigates the market and volatility timing ability of CTAs and examines whether discretionary CTAs display different market timing skills from systematic CTAs. The goal of their study is to formally test the hypothesis as to whether trend-following CTAs possess timing ability due to the commonlyobserved similarities between market timers and trend followers. They also explore whether CTAs display market timing ability in those markets that are the focus of their trading strategy.
Their research reports that previous studies such as Fung and Hsieh (2001) show that one important challenge in testing for the presence of market timing ability is that models employing traditional factors have low explanatory power for CTA returns, and, therefore, may be unable to detect the presence of market timing skills. Besides, the traditional indices that are based on equity and fixed-income markets may not include important risk factors such as those related to various currencies, commodities, or interest rates that are present in most CTA portfolios. Unlike previous studies, Kazemi and Li use a set of futures-related factors that are based on returns from the most heavily traded futures contracts. They find that these factors possess much higher explanatory power for CTA returns than traditional factors. Henriksson and Merton (1981) develop a test for market timing skills and assume that the mutual fund manager allocates capital between risk-free assets and equities based on forecasts of the future excess market returns. Busse (1999) extends the model to detect combined return and volatility timing. Kazemi and Li (2009) Elton, Gruber, and Rentzler (1987 , 1989 , 1990 ) who almost two decades earlier report that publicly-traded commodity funds did (1) fees accrue on a monthly basis and (2) high watermarks, when applicable, increase at the rate of return on T-bills. A high watermark applies when a managed futures manager only receives performance fees on that particular pool of invested money when its ending value is greater than its previous highest value. Should the investment drop in value, then the managers must bring it back above the previous highest value before they become eligible for performance fees again. Bhardwaj et al. (2008) CTAs for perceived diversification benefits and mandates for alternative investments (e.g., pension funds) and end up staying invested despite facing poor performance.
The Diversification Benefits of Managed Futures in Time of Market Crisis
Diversification benefits of managed futures in the academic literature are based on the nature of the lack of observed correlation between managed futures returns and those of the traditional investment portfolios composed of bonds and equities. Studies by Lintner (1983) and Edwards and Liew (1999) , as well as those by Kat (2002) , Jensen, Johnson, and Mercer (2003) , and
Cerrahoglu (2005) show the risk reduction benefits of managed futures. Edwards and Caglayan (2001) examine the performance of various hedge funds and commodity fund investment styles during periods of both rising and falling stock prices. Understanding how different investment styles perform in bear stock markets is important. Research finds that commodity funds offer better downside risk protection than hedge funds. Oberuc (1992) , who focuses on the performance of managed futures outside the United
States, provides a case for investors including managed futures in their traditional stock and equity portfolios. According to Oberuc (p. 329), … after the stock market crash of October 1987, investors realized that pinning their hopes of portfolio protection on stock selection methodologies was not successful. Indeed, it was found that diversifying a portfolio across equities from multiple countries provided very little protection since most countries' stock markets crashed at the same time. If stock selection did not provide the key to protection against portfolio drawdowns, then just what is the answer? Investment theory tells us that diversification across multiple investments that are not fundamentally linked with each other is the key. Unfortunately, all stocks are tied together through their linkage to something often referred to as the "market line." This means that as the stock market goes down (as measured by any of a number of market indexes), most individual stocks also tend to go down at the same time. Therefore, stock diversification is of little value against portfolio loss.
Oberuc (1992) analyzes the effect of using managed futures in combination with investment portfolios in four European countries (the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Switzerland) over the 19791989 period. His findings reveal that these portfolios, whether or not they use currency-hedged or unhedged managed futures, seem to perform significantly better (i.e., higher return given the same level of risk) than those portfolios that did not include Despite the relatively lower returns and higher fees reported in Bhardwaj et al. (2008) , Kaminski (2011a) observes that managed futures investments styles have some desirable characteristics not commonly found in the rather aggressive hedge funds trading programs such as the global macro hedge funds. Kaminski comments that managed futures trade exclusively in the most liquid, efficient, and credit protected markets and their profitability must rely on those characteristics in order to obtain a competitive edge. Therefore, managed futures will not profit from credit exposures and/or illiquidity, which are commonly cited as risks and opportunities for most hedge fund strategies. Supporting the use of managed futures, Kaminski (2011b, p. 1) contends that:
Following the onset of a market crisis, managed futures will be one of the few strategies able to adapt to take advantage of the persistent trends across the wide range of asset classes they trade. It is important also to note that managed futures are not about timing equity markets -it profits from a wide range of opportunities during market crises (this includes currencies, bonds, short rates, soft commodities, energies, metals, and equity indices). When equity markets are not in crisis, markets are highly competitive and efficient -especially futures markets. Strategies like hedge funds often provide seductive returns, but many researchers have pointed out that these strategies often contain hidden risks related to liquidity and credit exposures.
Kaminski (2011b) also maintains that managed futures are an offensive investment rather than a defensive investment. The author argues that tail-risk insurance such as a longdated, out-of-the-money puts on equity indexes, with potential for immense payoffs in the event of a crisis, provide little or no return outside the period of the event crisis because they are prohibitively expensive if purchased during a crisis. Therefore, successful implementation of such a strategy is highly dependent on market timing. As market timing tends to be difficult, Kaminski classifies such tail-risk insurance as being defensive. In the case of managed futures, she contends that a managed futures strategy is a highly adaptable, liquid strategy poised to take advantage of predictable trends during market-crisis events but also able to provide modest returns over time and even in the absence of market timing ability. On that basis, Kaminski describes managed futures as an offensive approach dealing with tail events.
A few points discussed by Kaminski (2011a Kaminski ( , 2011b Trend followers size positions and place stops based on volatility, Rothberg notes. A low volatility environment tilts the odds in favor of trends followers because it allows them to take bigger positions with tight stop losses. But if prices move swiftly in a high volatility regime, trend followers will not be able to take a large enough position to fully benefit from the move, assuming they are not caught on the wrong side of the trend in the first place.
Though the extent of volatility of market environment may affect the profitability of managed futures, appropriate allocation mechanism within equities portfolios are an important determinant. The proportion of managed futures investors committed to their equities portfolios therefore would affect overall portfolio performance. Tee (2009) relates the allocated proportion of managed futures to reflect investors' risk tolerance level and shows that using appropriate models in the asset allocation process can potentially lead to better returns for investors who include some managed futures funds in their equities portfolios.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In the academic literature, managed futures are normally referred to as "trend-followers" because investors use their proprietary trading models to capture trends in futures prices. They also take long or short positions in low transaction cost investment vehicles, such as in futures contracts, in an attempt to benefit from trends in commodity prices, exchanges rates, interest rates, and equity markets, similar to many other alternative investments such as the hedge funds. As a result, CTAs are also listed as a strategy of hedge funds with their style named "managed futures." Over the past 20 years, empirical evidence generally shows that the performance of managed futures is, on average, similar to returns on risk-free rates such U.S.
Treasury bills. Bhardwaj et al. (2008) Chen, Neill, and Zhu (2005) report that the key foundation for futures returns, as posited by some practitioners and academics, is the risk transfer function of the futures market itself (Kritzman, 1993; Lightner, 2003; Spurgin, 2003) . Some commercial market participants such as hedgers are willing to pay the equivalent of an insurance premium to non-commercial participants (i.e., investors) for assuming risk. In the aggregate and over the long term, hedgers are willing to act consistently to transfer risk, even if they expect the spot markets to move in their favor, and in doing so, pay a net positive insurance premium. As providers of liquidity, investors receive this premium in the form of net trading profits. Unlike hedgers, investors in the futures markets regard "derivatives" as an asset class. They trade for profit-making purposes instead of hedging exposure of an underlying asset. Thus, the trading strategy should accommodate the trend that hedgers must follow in order to continuously and effectively transfer risk. The futures markets for trading managed futures are regulated, though the performances of managed futures traders or CTAs are not as regulated as the markets in which they participate. This trading arena differs from investment trusts or closed end funds that are listed on a stock exchange. Therefore, information may not be as complete as it should be in order to evaluate whether the performance of managed futures is correlated with future price movements. However, the number and type of the CTAs and hedgers in the future markets may affect the performance of managed futures. This relationship differs from one type of futures instrument to another, as liquidity tends to differ among derivative securities.
The diversification benefits of managed futures are based on the lack of observed correlation between managed futures returns and traditional investment portfolios composed of bonds and equities. Kat (2002) , Jensen et al. (2003) , and Cerrahoglu (2005) provide evidence of the risk-reduction benefits of managed futures. Interestingly, the diversification benefits of managed futures again attracted huge attention after the financial crisis of 20072008. Thus, the fact that managed futures tend to trade in liquid markets becomes a favorable factor. Kaminski (2011a Kaminski ( , 2011b terms managed futures as "crisis alpha," showing how it potentially adds value to a portfolio in market crisis. Researchers find using managed futures in this way is similar to that of the insurance-style strategies, with the latter often being criticized as costly.
Others contend that directly investing in futures or commodity markets may be better for investors as they can avoid the higher fee structure of managed futures. However, no empirical comparative studies on the costs of investing in managed futures support the claim. Due to the low correlations of managed futures' returns with the stock and bonds' assets and despite relatively lower returns, the amount of capital to be invested in managed futures (either as stand-alone or for diversification purpose) has become an important issue, and even more so 
